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Book Review 
Tamsin Jones, A Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of 
Religion: Apparent Darkness (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2011) 
Tamsin Jones’ overriding aim in this work is “to probe the coherence of his 
[Marion’s] corpus” (1). Specifically, Jones sets out to investigate a tension in 
Marion’s philosophy of religion between (i) the notion of ‘givenness’, 
wherein it is forbidden (a priori) to rule out the appearance of any 
phenomenon; and (ii) the notion of “saturation”, which prohibits conceptual 
idolatry and thus does not allow any phenomenon to be constrained by a 
single interpretation. This, presumably, is a tension because, on the one 
hand, anything that is given must be given to consciousness and hence is 
circumscribed by the conditions as to what can be given to consciousness; 
but, on the other hand, these very conditions do not allow for saturated 
phenomena, that is, phenomena that exceed any and all conditions. Jones 
writes: “My task is to explore whether there is a point where the brilliant 
paradoxical balance can no longer be maintained and the various tensions 
dissolve into incoherence” (1-2). In a novel approach to this paradox, Jones 
focuses her discussion on Marion’s retrieval of Greek patristic authors, 
especially Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa.  
The analysis of this patristic retrieval begins in the first chapter, where 
Jones asks: “Whom [i.e., which Greek patristic sources] does Marion cite? 
How frequently? In what works? And most importantly, why?” (13) In the 
course of a survey of Marion’s writings, Jones offers the following theses: (i) 
the “softer” or less contestable thesis that Marion retrieves Greek patristic 
sources, and particularly Dionysius and Nyssa, “univocally” – i.e., in the 
same way, without paying much attention to the differences between these 
sources, so that both ‘are treated almost monolithically as a source of “truth” 
or “orthodoxy” with which to bolster Marion’s own contemporary theses’ 
(15); and (ii) the “stronger” or more controversial thesis that Marion defers 
to Gregory in such a way that the work of Gregory becomes a hermeneutical 
lens through which Dionysius’ own writings are understood. Jones argues, 
for example, that at decisive points in Marion’s debate with Derrida over the 
metaphysical status of Dionysius’ apophatic theology, Marion comes to rely 
upon a Cappadocian theory of language, particularly as it was expressed in 
Gregory’s Contra Eunomium (35-36). 
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 The second chapter delves deeper into Marion’s patristic retrieval and 
calls into question his univocal treatment of Dionysius and Gregory by way 
of exposing “the significant differences between the apophaticisms of Gregory 
and Dionysius” (44-45). After a brief survey of the comparative scholarship 
on Gregory and Dionysius, Jones offers a close reading of the depiction of 
Moses’ ascent into darkness as an image of apophasis in Gregory’s Life of 
Moses and Dionysius’ Mystical Theology. This leads Jones to the philosophy of 
language embedded in each theologian’s apophaticism. Gregory, it is 
shown, emphasises the conventionality of language on the basis of the view 
that there is a fundamental ontological divide (diastema) between Creator 
and the created world, and that language resides on the created side of this 
divide. Dionysius, however, is more optimistic about the potential of 
language to reveal (and not only conceal) God, and this on the basis of his 
understanding of analogy and participation. Jones then makes more explicit 
the ways in which these philosophies of language are situated within 
divergent visions of the world, God and the human being. Given this 
divergence between Gregory and Dionysius, a univocal retrieval of the two 
(like that performed by Marion) is ruled out. But, I wonder, are these 
conceptions (of God, creation, human perfection, etc.) mutually exclusive, or 
only differences in emphasis?  
In the third chapter, on phenomenological method, Jones discusses 
Marion’s three major articulations of this method. Marion’s first articulation 
occurs in Reduction and Givenness, and is placed in the context of the 
Husserlian “breakthrough” (the first reduction) and the Heideggerian 
“broadening” (from beings to Being, or the second reduction). Broadening 
the method even further, Marion makes givenness the sole horizon (the third 
reduction). In his second articulation, found in Being Given, Marion defends 
the primacy of givenness and also claims that the results of the 
phenomenological method are universal (so that they don’t merely apply to a 
limited region or domain – e.g., theology) and indubitable. This, at least, is 
Jones’ reading, and it does seem to impair the credibility of Marion’s 
method. Marion’s third articulation, developed in more recent writings 
(such as In Excess), continues the theme of universality by defending the idea 
of phenomenology as “first philosophy” – “first” in the sense of being a 
universal precondition for all other fields of inquiry.  
In contrast to the notion of a “first philosophy” yielding certain and 
universal results, Marion famously went on to develop the idea of a 
‘saturated’ phenomenon, a phenomenon that exceeds all limits and 
categories (as Jones puts it: “Like a 3000-watt appliance being plugged into a 
20-amp outlet, no general concept or pattern is able to receive or contain it,” 
112) and hence requires an “endless hermeneutics.” In the fourth chapter, 
Jones takes a critical view of this hermeneutical turn in Marion, arguing that 
Marion’s retrieval of Gregory amounts in this instance to a missed 
opportunity: “Gregory’s treatment of scriptural interpretation as an 
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infinitely open and infinitely transformative response to the excess of 
revelation provides a rich instance of how Marion might think through the 
relationship between the pure givenness of the saturated phenomenon and 
one’s subsequent interpretation of it. It is an opportunity that Marion 
misses” (129).  
 In chapter five Jones continues investigating the blind spots and 
tensions in Marion’s work, and goes on to suggest that Marion might find 
solutions to some of his difficulties by turning more insistently towards 
Gregory of Nyssa’s (rather than Dionysius’) views on knowledge and 
language. Jones concludes her study with two under-explored issues which 
“trouble Marion’s phenomenological project” (156): practices (such as silent 
prayer) that cultivate the capacity to receive phenomena, and how to make 
normative evaluations of these phenomena. Jones ends by noting the 
apologetic tenor of Marion’s work, though it is an apologetics that “does not 
aim to convince by rational proof,” but “represents an openness to receive 
the unexpected” (160).   
 Jones has here offered an excellent analysis of the patristic genealogy 
of Marion’s phenomenology: clear, precise and richly documented in its 
accounts of Marion’s thought, as well as astute and balanced in its critical 
appraisals. If only more philosophers – both analytic and Continental – 
could write this way.   
N. N. Trakakis 
Australian Catholic University 
 
